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Abstract
Recent massive failures in the power grid acted as a wake up call for all utilities and con-
sumers. This leads to aggressive pursue a more intelligent grid which addresses the concerns of
reliability, efficiency, security, quality and sustainability for the energy consumers and produc-
ers alike. One of the many features of the smart grid is a discrete energy system consisting of
distributed energy sources capable of operating independently from the main grid known as the
microgrid. The main focus of the microgrid is to ensure a reliable and affordable energy security.
However, it also can be vulnerable to cyber attack and we study the effect of price modification
of electricity attack on the microgrid, given that they are able to operate independently from
the main grid. This attack consists of two stages, 1) Separate the microgrids from the main grid
(islanding) and 2) Failing the nodes inside the microgrid. Empirical results on IEEE Bus data
help us evaluate our approach under various settings of grid parameters.
Keywords— Microgrid, cyber-attack, smart grid, Complex Systems, Cyber-physical Systems
1 Introduction
Failures in the power grid in the recent times with examples 2003 blackout in the Northeastern
U.S. [1] and 2012 blackout in India [2] gave us the evidence about the catastrophic failures which
can have acute effects on the modern world. Excluding the natural disasters such as earthquakes,
hurricanes and solar flare, the power grid is also vulnerable to terrorists and Electromagnetic
(EMP) attacks [3]. Because of this, the utility industry is undergoing through massive grid
modernization efforts in effort to tackle the situations like the blackouts discussed above. The
massive blackouts came as a wake up call to utilities and consumers alike, climate change, over-
population and scarcity of natural resources. In reaction, the industry began to strive for a
more intelligent power grid called Smartgrid. One of many ”smart” features of the smart grid
is automated microgrids that connect seamlessly with the main grid, and may operate indepen-
dently when needed. This ensures efficiency, security, reliability, quality and sustainability for
energy consumers and producers alike.
A microgrid is defined as a discrete energy system consisting of distributed energy sources
(e.g. renewables, conventional, storage) and loads capable of operating independently from
the main grid. The important goal of microgrid is to increase the self-sufficiency of energy and
independence of system operation in local energy communities. A microgrid includes generation,
a distribution system, consumption and storage, and manages them with advanced monitoring,
control and automation systems. A fully-developed microgrid has the capability of automatically
disconnecting and operating independently from the main grid. For example, in case of a natural
disaster, if the energy service is disrupted from the main grid, the automated controls will cut off
the microgrid from the main grid in order to avoid cascading failure. Given there is a blackout
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or cascading failure in the power network, the microgrids separate themselves from the main
grid. Or the blackout has itself caused separation of the microgrid from the main power grid.
The internal power generating resources balance the demands after the separation.
The existing class of cyberattacks and EMP attacks are targeted towards the main grid
without considering the reliability of the microgrids. Microgrids are safe from the cascading
failure effect caused by the above attacks in the main grid. They separate themselves from the
main grid and operate independently once they sense disruption or the main grid is cut off. Also
a single point attack is not possible given the distributed generation units of the microgrid is
local to itself than a central generation as in the case of the main grid. In order to attack the
microgrids, only the severe blackouts in the other areas of the smart grid would not have any
impact. In the other way around, cyber attacker would not be successful in attacking nodes
in microgrid unless the microgrid is islanded, because they would still keep receiving power
from the main grid. In addition, power generation done at a smaller scale is costlier, hence the
microgrid’s self generation is much costlier than the power provided by the main grid. Taking
both the scenarios into the consideration, we demonstrate that the microgrid is still vulnerable
to cyber attacks.
In our approach, we force the microgrids run solely on their own power by islanding them
from the main power grid. We achieve this through price modification attack on the entire
grid, but with focus on islanding the microgrid i.e. attacking nodes which will lead to failure
of edges separating microgrid from the main power grid. The next step involves launching the
price modification attack inside each of the microgrids, to fail as many lines as possible and
cause cascading failures, leading to massive failure in the smart grid as well as the microgrids
connected to the smart grid. Our contribution to the paper are 1) We have proposed a new
cyberattack through price modification against the microgrids. We have structured the attacks
given the self sustaining nature of the microgrids. It is a 2 step attack, where first we separate
the microgrids from the main grid and in the second step, we attack the load nodes of the
microgrid itself. 2) We have ran the experiments on IEEE 14 Bus data along with IEEE 9 Bus
data serving as the microgrids.
The rest of the paper is as structured as follows. Section 2 describes the DC power flow
model used in the Smart grid including the microgrid. Section 3 describes the attack model for
the Price Modification Attack (PMA). In section 4, we evaluate our proposed algorithm and
discuss mitigation measures in section 5. Section 6 concludes our paper.
2 Power Flow
Power flow in smart grid as well as the microgrid are governed by power laws. We have adopted
the widely used model of linearized DC model over the AC model. DC power flow approximation
is chosen because it is solved far more quickly and is proved to be accurate under good operating
conditions. In order to reduce the running time and make the linearization feasible, the following
assumptions are taken into consideration:
• Phase angle differences are small and hence we can use sin θij = θij and cos θij = 1, where
θij is the phase angle between the voltages at the two nodes i and j.
• Lossless lines; i.e. the resistance of the arcs/lines is negligible.
• Voltage profile is kept flat.
We briefly describe the linearized or DC power flow model. In the linearized approximation,
we are given a power grid represented by a directed graph G, where:
• Each node i ∈ V corresponds to either a power generator (i.e., a supply node), or to a
load (i.e., a demand node), or to a node that neither generates nor consumes power. The
set of generator nodes are denoted by P .
• If node i is a generator, then there are values 0 ≤ Pmini ≤ Pmaxi . If the generator is
operated, then its output must be in the range [Pmini , P
max
i ]; if the generator is not
operated, then its output is zero. In general, Pmini > 0.
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• If node i is a demand, then the ”nominal” demand is given by Dnomi . The set of demands
or demand nodes is denoted by D.
• The edges E represent power/transmission lines. For each line (i, j), two parameters are
given i.e. xij > 0 (the resistance or reactance) and uij (the capacity).
Now, given a set P of operating generators, the linearized power flow is a solution to the
system of constraints given in the following set of the equations. For each edge (i, j), fij
represents the power flow on the edge (transmission line) (i, j). In the case where fij < 0, power
is effectively flowing from j to i. Additionally, the phase angle at node i is given by the variable
θi. Given a node i, δ
+(i)(δ−(i)) is the set of lines oriented out of (into) node i. The power flow
equations are given below:
∑
(i,j)∈δ+i
fij −
∑
(j,i)∈δ−i
fji =
 Pi i ∈ P−Di i ∈ D
0 otherwise
(1)
θi − θj − xijfij = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (2)
Pmini ≤ Pi ≤ Pmaxi , ∀i ∈ P (3)
0 ≤ Dj ≤ Dnomj , ∀j ∈ D (4)
3 Attack Model and Proposed Algorithms
In this section, we introduce the two step price modification attack (PMA) in the smart grid
to disrupt the services of the microgrid as shown in Fig 1. Given the robustness of smart grid,
the price modification attack is launched in 2 steps. Step 1 being the process to separate the
microgrid from the main grid called as islanding, so that they start operating solely on the local
distributed generation sources (which includes PVs, generators and batteries). In step 2, we
attack the individual component in the microgrid to make the system go unstable and cause
failure of other nodes inside the microgrid.
Figure 1: Overview of the PMA.
3.1 Cascading Failure
Before moving on to the attack, we discuss the cascading failure model adopted in the paper.
We have adopted the cascading failure described in [6, 7] which is an extension of the model as
proposed in [8]. The total power generation matches the total demand, given the steady state
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of the power grid. When some lines/arcs are disconnected, or they fail, they are removed from
G. Following which, the total demand and supply are balanced or adjusted within each island
or component by decreasing the load and supply at the various buses. Overall system state is
again calculated given the linearized DC power model described in the previous section. The new
flows may exceed the capacity and as a result, the corresponding lines will become overheated.
The outages are modeled by moving average of the power flow f˜ tij : f˜
t
ij = αfij + (1 − α)f˜ t−1ij .
Here parameter α used to encode memory so as to model thermal effects. For memoryless
system, α = 1. For the paper, we use the following rule: line fails if fij > uij , where uij is the
capacity or flow limit for the transmission line ij. The moving average approximates thermal
effects, including heating and cooling from prior states to first order [9]. The algorithm for the
cascading failure is given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Cascade Failure Template
Data: Connected Power Grid Network G(V,E)
Result: S1: Lines which failed
S2: Nodes which failed
1 while Network is not stable do
2 Adjust the total demand to the total supply within each island.
3 Use equations (1)-(4) to calculate power flows in G.
4 For all lines computer the moving average f˜ tij = αfij + (1− α)f˜ tij .
5 Remove all lines that have moving average flows greater than the capacity (f˜ tij > uij) and add to S1.
6 Add the failed nodes to S2.
7 If no more line fails, then network is stable, break the loop.
8 Return S1, S2
3.2 Islanding the Microgrid
Given the lower protection and lower sophistication involved in attacking the consumption sec-
tor [12] (the other sectors are generation and distribution and control), we focus our attention
to this sector.. This class of cyber-intrusion alters the electricity prices through fabricated price
signals thereby altering load at certain grid locations through the Internet and by means of
automatic and distributed software intruding agents. In order to island the microgrid, we need
to disconnect the main power generation sources from the microgrid. Attacker alters the price
of electricity through modification of the price signal sent from the energy distributor over the
communication network. This causes disruption in the service from the main grid to the micro-
grids and thus forcing the microgrid to work in islanded mode. Once the microgrid is in islanded
mode, its own power generators are the only sources available to it, which becomes the focus of
attack in the second step of the attack.
Minimum cost to break e* [MCB(e*)]
min
∑
i∈D
ci(zi)
s.t. (1 + ki)Bi ≥ Di · (ri − zi · ρi) ∀i ∈ D
Pij > uij ij = e
∗
zi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ D
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Every bus/user i receives the electricity rate ri from the Internet which we assume to be
accessible to the attacker to manipulate or alter. Di is the total demand at the load node i.
The total bill is given by (1 + ki)Bi where Bi represents the users targeted billing amount and
ki represents the sensitivity of the user towards billing amount. ki = 0 indicates that the user is
not willing to pay anymore than the targeted billing amount. For simplification we allow the ki
with a maximum value of 1. The line (i, j) fails when the power flow through the transmission
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line goes over its capacity. A certain portion of the rate is allowed to change for each user given
the baseline constraints set up or hard coded by electricity distribution companies. Hence, we
have the maximum rate change (MRC) ρi, which represents the maximum change in the rate
that the attacker is allowed. The attacker can choose what percentage of the MRC it wants to
change denoted by zi which lies between 0 and 1.
Given the automated demand side management, one of the ”smart” features of the smart
grid, the rate change causes automated increase in the use of the demand for the same household
or the company, such as starting up the laundry, more frequent use of the heating/cooling
devices, etc. There is a cost associated with the change done by the attacker. Here we consider
a linear cost function c(.) for simplicity. The integer programming for calculating the minimum
cost for breaking the edge e∗ is given by MCB(e∗). After knowing the MCB for each edge, we
find the lines that need to broken to separate the microgrids from the main grid, called Islanding
the Microgrids (IM) given by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Islanding the microgrid (IM)
Data: Connected Power Grid Network G(V,E), Budget A
Result: S1: Lines which failed, M Microgrids that were islanded
1 Initialize current cost T = 0
2 while T < A do
3 Sort the lines (E∗) according to their islanding potential in increasing order
4 foreach e∗ ∈ E∗ do
5 if T +MCB(e∗) < A then
6 Break the edge e∗
7 T = T +MCB(e∗)
8 M = M∪ microgrids disconnected from main grid
9 E∗ = E∗ - disconnected edges
10 S1 = S1∪ disconnected edges
11 else
12 break
13 Return S1,M
Main%
Grid
MG1
MG2
Main%
Grid
MG1
MG2
Load PV
DG Battery%Storage
Islanding%
Microgrids
Breaking
Microgrids Microgrid
Figure 2: Price Modification Attack showing two steps of attack. Step 1: Islanding Microgrid(IM):
Separating the microgrid from the main grid and forcing it to work independently. Step 2: Breaking
Microgrid (BM) Failing the load nodes inside the microgrid. In the figure, MG1 and MG2 represent
the microgrids 1 and 2 that are connected to the main grid. PV and DG denote Photovoltaic panel
and diesel generator.
In IM, we first calculate the minimum cost to break (MCB) for all the transmission lines.
Islanding potential of a line is given by the number of the microgrids that are separated from
the main grid due to the failure of the corresponding line’s failure divided by the MCB. This is
followed by sorting of all the edges in the increasing order of their potential. We fail the edges
in the computed order, given that the constraint of budget A is met. We keep updating the set
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of disconnected or islanded microgrids M and the set of disconnected edges S1. The temporary
budget usage T is also increased by the MCB every iteration where there is a line failure. This
process is repeated till we exhaust out of resources or all the microgrids are islanded.
3.3 Breaking the Microgrid
After we have islanded the microgrids, they start to operate independently from the main grid
and its own power generation sources (such as photovoltaic panels, battery storage and diesel
generators) ramp up to meet the demand of the load nodes that have been separated from the
power grid. This feature ensures the reliability of the microgrid and power security for the
consumers in the microgrid. Although the microgrids are much smaller in nature, the attacker
can modify the rates of particular generation units inside the microgrid, leading to the failure
of the particular generation unit and leading to the further failures of other generating units in
the microgrid ending with complete failure of the microgrid.
Breaking the transmission Lines (BL)
max
∑
e(ij)∈E
yij
s.t. (1 + ki)Bi ≥ Di · (ri − zi · ρi) ∀i ∈ D∑
i∈D
ci(zi) ≤ A
yij < 1 +
fij − uij
uij
∀e(ij) ∈ E
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀e(ij) ∈ E
zi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ D
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
In this second step of the PMA, that is breaking the microgrid, our aim is to fail as many as
loads inside the microgrid. Failure of a load or demand node occurs when it is separated from all
the generating resources similar to the islanding process of the microgrid itself. Here we utilize
the price modification cyberattack to increase the load of the demand nodes by changing the
price information for the generation units. This leads to unbalance and recalculation of power
flow in the network and can cause overflow in the circuits and leads to transmission line failures
resulting in the break down of the demand nodes.
However in the microgrid due to the presence of multiple source of energy generation, instead
of reducing the Internet price for the load nodes and randomly attacking any power generating
device, intuitively the lowest capacity generation device is selected. The rate for the particular
generation device is then lowered. Once most of the demand node start using the selected source
for power usage, the overall load in the network is manipulated to cause maximum number of
failures through Breaking the transmission Lines (BL) algorithm. This continues till the resource
gets exhausted. For simplicity we assume a linear cost function cgui for modifying the price of the
generation unit i. The above proposed approach is presented in Algorithm 3 namely Breaking
the Microgrid (BM).
In BM, the temporary budget usage T is check against maximum resource A to verify if
resources are available to cause internal demand node failures inside the microgrid. If so, a
sorted list of the generation units according to their capacity in increasing order is used while
picking the generation source for the corresponding price modification. If the cost cgui follows
the resource constraint, we alter the price and perform the breaking the transmission lines (BL).
This process is repeated till the resources are exhausted and the set of failed nodes S is returned.
3.4 Price Modification Attack
We combine the above two steps Islanding the Microgrid and Breaking the Microgrid to launch
the Price Modification Attack (PMA) given by Algorithm 4. We initiate the PMA with discon-
necting the microgrid from the generating source and BM is executed once there is one islanded
microgrid. This is continued till we exhaust the maximum resource allocated A.
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Algorithm 3: Breaking the microgrid(BM)
Data: Connected Power Grid Network G(V,E), Budget A
Result: S: set of failed nodes inside microgrid
1 Initialize current cost T = 0
2 while T < A do
3 Sort the generation units (GU∗) in increasing order of their capacity
4 foreach gu∗i ∈ GU∗ do
5 if T + cgui (gu
∗
i ) < A then
6 Reduce price of the gui for all nodes
7 BL(gui) //Breaking the lines with price changes
8 GU∗ = GU ∗ −gui
9 S = S∪ failed nodes
10 else
11 break
12 Return S
Algorithm 4: Price modification attack (PMA)
Data: Connected Power Grid Network G(V,E),
Budget A
Result: S1 Number of node failures; S2 Number of microgrids islanded; S3 Number of node failures inside the
microgrid
1 while max resource A not utilized do
2 Islanding the Microgrids (IM)
3 if ∃ Islanded microgrid then
4 Breaking the Microgrids (BM)
5 Return S1, S2, S3
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the different algorithms we proposed. In the exper-
iments reported in this section we used a 3.0 GHz Xeon machine with 2 MB L2 cache and 12
GB RAM. All experiments were run using a single core. For the power system simulation, we
use the matlab package called MatPower [10]. 50 runs of each cycle was run and averaged for
consistency. We use the random algorithm as a baseline to compare our proposed algorithms. In
order to represent the microgrid system we take IEEE 14 bus system data as the smart grid as
shown in Fig 3 and set up microgrids on bus 13 and 14. To represent the microgrid architecture,
we use the IEEE 9 bus test system with 3 generators and 3 loads as shown in Fig. 4. By default
we keep the system at the line capacity reduced by 60% and maximum resource at 20% and
microgrid load is kept at the default. Node or load failure occurs when a particular load gets
cut off from the all power generating sources. Microgrid is islanded when it is separated from
the power generating source in the main grid and thereafter starts operating independently.
In all the experiments the same approach was employed: first, we calculated the optimal
powerflow in the main grid with the preset parameters [11]. In case of load imbalance due to
cascading failure or price modification; both the demand and total power were made equal and
power flow was recalculated. The line was failed if there was any overflow i.e. Pij > uij .
In the Fig. 5a, we evaluate the PMA by varying the line capacity in the grid. By reducing
the line capacity, the power flow in the transmission gets closer to capacity of the network, thus
increasing the stress level of the grid. As the capacity gets reduced, it becomes much easier to
attack and increase the power overflow the transmission line’s capacity. Here we reduce the line
capacity by percentage from 0 to 78 and evaluate PMA algorithm on the grid with respect to
the variance. As we can verify from the experiment, PMA algorithm performs really well not
just in the overall node failures, but is also to separate the microgrids from the main grid and
failing the nodes inside the microgrid. Although the random algorithm is blind and not able
to island the microgrids as efficiently and performs really worse in failing the loads inside the
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Figure 3: IEEE 14 bus system data. This represents our basic smart grid, we assume the location
of the microgrids to be at bus number 13 and 14. [11]
Figure 4: IEEE 9 bus system data. This consists of 3 generators such as G1, G2, and G3; and 3
loads namely Load A, Load B and Load C.
microgrid.
Then we evaluate the PMA with respect to change in the maximum resource available to the
attacker as shown in Fig 5b. We vary maximum resource A from 0% to 65% and verify the effect
of PMA and random algorithm in the grid. Attacker gains more means to attack the grid and
more loads to reduce the price information such that the overall load in the grid increases with
the increase in the maximum resource. Hence, the rise in the number of load failures, islanded
microgrids and load failures inside the microgrids.
Here we test the reliability of the microgrids against PMA given the variance in overall
variance of microgrid loads. We vary the load from 13.5 units (default) to 21.5 units. As the
total load of the microgrids increase, it becomes more vulnerable to PMA, given the increased
stress the transmission lines from the generating source to the microgrids. This works in the
favor of the PMA and after the islanding, the PMA proceeds with breaking the microgrid and
fails much more nodes than the random algorithm.
5 Mitigation Measures
The protection mechanisms from the Internet based price modification attack could be accom-
plished by protection of price and command signals; smart meter and data center protection;
load shedding and load relocation ;and attack detection and learning demand patterns [12].
Based on the type of load and defense mechanism, full load protection, i.e., protecting all vul-
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Figure 5: Evaluation of Price Modification Attack with respect to various grid parameters such as
line capacity, maximum resource and microgrid load.
nerable loads, can be a significant expense. Assuming that protecting every node in the network
against price modification attack is neither feasible nor economical, we suggest the approach of
the greedily choosing the most critical nodes in the network. These critical nodes are found by
the algorithms IM and BM whose electricity prices are modified to bring maximum failure in the
network. Protection of critical nodes found in IM algorithm restricts attacker to manually sepa-
rate the microgrid from the main grid. And protection of critical nodes found in BM algorithm
restricts attacker to fail edges inside the microgrid when it starts operating independently.
6 Conclusion
This paper deals with price modification cyberattack on the microgrids as a part of the smart
grid. The proposed method is applied to the test system, in order to demonstrate its applica-
bility. The proposed 2-step PMA on the microgrid involves disconnecting the microgrid from
the main grid in the first step in order to force the microgrid to operate independently, and
in the second step, we try to the fail the nodes inside the microgrid itself. The effect of PMA
under various parameters of the power grid network such as line capacity, maximum resource
and microgrid load are presented and discussed. In the future work we would like to consider
the multiple variations of the microgrid i.e. AC and DC microgrids, eventually which follow
different. We would also consider the impact of both active and reactive power flow and their
role in stability of the network or rather instability of the network.
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